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NOTE 
DEFINING "ORDINARY PRUDENTIAL 
DOCTRINES" AFTER BOOKER: 
WHY THE LIMITED REMAND IS THE 
LEAST OF MANY EVILS 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1984, Congress created the Sentencing Guidelines to help prevent 
disparity in sentencing. I The Guidelines were supposed to narrow the 
discretion that sentencing judges exercised, in order to make sentences 
more uniform.2 In United States v. Booker, however, the United States 
Supreme Court declared that the way in which federal criminal 
defendants had been sentenced for nearly twenty years was 
unconstitutional. 3 The Court stated that the Sixth Amendment right to 
trial by jury applies to the Sentencing Guidelines.4 The Court went on to 
state that, in cases that were on direct review at the time of the decision, 
"ordinary prudential doctrines" would govern sentences that were 
suddenly unconstitutional. 5 
Following the Court's attempt at clarification in Booker, a new 
I See Orrin G. Hatch, The Role of Congress in Sentencing: The United States Sentencing 
Commission, Mandatory Minimum Sentences, and the Search for a Certain and Effective Sentencing 
System, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 185, 188-189 (1993). Senator Hatch was one of the primary 
drafters of the law that created the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. 
2 1d. 
3 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 226-227 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in 
part). 
4 See id. 
S See id. at 268 (Breyer, J., for the Court in part). 
609 
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disparity has emerged.6 The various circuits have adopted four different 
interpretations of what the Court meant by "ordinary prudential 
doctrines.,,7 The one clear fact that has emerged is that defendants are 
being treated differently based solely on where they committed their 
crimes,8 exactly the type of disparity that Congress was trying to avoid 
when it created the Sentencing Guidelines.9 The Solicitor General has 
urged the Supreme Court to address this disparity.1O However, to date 
the Supreme Court has declined to do so. 11 
The Ninth Circuit decided to use Alfred Ameline's case as its 
vehicle for choosing what approach it would take when a defendant had 
not preserved Booker error. 12 Ameline's case had already taken an 
extended tour through the federal courts. Ameline pled guilty to selling 
methamphetarnines and was sentenced in 2002, before Booker was 
decided. 13 However, while his case was on direct review, the Supreme 
Court decided, in Blakely v. Washington, that Washington's sentencing 
scheme was unconstitutional. 14 In light of Blakely, Ameline's appellate 
panel sua sponte raised the issue of whether the Sentencing Guidelines 
violated the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury. 15 The panel held 
that the Guidelines did violate the Sixth Amendment and remanded his 
case for a new sentencing hearing. 16 
Ameline filed a petition for rehearing. 17 While that petition was 
pending, the Supreme Court decided, in United States v. Booker, that the 
Sentencing Guidelines violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial by 
jury. 18 The original panel, noting that Ameline had not raised a Sixth 
6 Peter A. Jenkins, Requiring the Unknown or Preserving Reason: United States v. 
Gonzalez-Huerta and the Tenth Circuit's Compromise Approach to Booker Error, 83 DENY. U. L. 
REv. 815 (2006). 
7 The four approaches, which will be discussed in detail infra, are (1) the hard-line 
approach, (2) the presumption-of-prejudice approach, (3) the "compromise" approach, and (4) the 
limited-remand approach. 
8 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815. 
9 See Hatch, supra note I, at 188-189. 
10 See Brief of the United States, Rodriguez v. United States, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (No. 04-
1148) 2005 WL 1210522 at *7. 
II See, e.g., Rodriguez v. United States, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (denying cert.). 
12 See United States v. Ameline, 401 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005) (order granting rehearing en 
banc). Booker error occurred whenever a defendant was sentenced under the mandatory Sentencing 
Guidelines. See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1077-1078 (9th Cir. 2005) [Ameline II1J. 
13 United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967, 970-971 (9th Cir. 2003) [Ameline IJ. 
14 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (2004). 
IS Ameline I, 376 F.3d at 971. 
16 Id. at 984. 
17 United States v. Ameline, 400 F.3d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 2004) [Ameline II]. 
18 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,226-227 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part). 
The history and use of the Sentencing Guidelines are discussed infra at notes 27-52 and 
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Amendment challenge, held that the sentence amounted to plain error 
and again remanded for resentencing. 19 The Ninth Circuit then took the 
case en banc to decide what procedure would be used for defendants 
raising unpreserved Booker error.20 The en banc panel adopted the 
"limited-remand" approach.21 
This Note examines the limited-remand approach in comparison 
with the approaches taken by the different circuits. Part I discusses the 
history of the Sentencing Guidelines and the cases, up to and including 
Booker, that completely changed the way the Sentencing Guidelines 
were used.22 Part II sets forth the history of the traditional plain error 
standard of review and the contemporary "Plain Error Problem.,,23 Part 
III examines the limited-remand approach and compares it with the 
approach taken in other circuits.24 Part IV argues that the limited-remand 
approach is the best of a list of bad possible choices but that the Ninth 
Circuit should have imposed a higher burden of proof on defendants 
before they could obtain a limited remand.25 Finally, Part V concludes 
that although it alters the traditional plain-error standard of review, the 
limited-remand approach is the most consistent with the intent of the 
majority that authored the remedial portion of the Booker opinion but 
would be improved with a higher burden on defendants.26 
I. BACKGROUND 
From the late nineteenth century until 1984, most federal crimes 
were sentenced based upon an indeterminate sentencing scheme. 27 
Under an indeterminate sentencing scheme, Congress simply set a range 
of sentences for each crime and left the particular sentence to the 
discretion of the sentencing judge. 28 Congress had the authority to 
legislate a determinate sentence for each particular crime. 29 However, 
accompanying text, as are the cases that led to Booker at notes 53-116 and accompanying text 
19 Ameline II, 400 F.3d at 649-650. 
banc). 
20 United States v. Ameline, 401 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2005) (order granting rehearing en 
21 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline III]. 
22 See infra notes 27 -134 and accompanying text. 
23 See infra notes 135-155 and accompanying text. 
24 See infra notes 156-191 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 192-246 and accompanying text. 
26 See infra notes 247 -252 and accompanying text. 
27 See Hatch, supra note I, at 186. 
28 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989). 
29 [d. at 364 (citing United States v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76 (1820) ("Congress, of 
course, has the power to fix the sentence for a federal crime .... "». 
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Congress generally gave the sentencing judge the discretion to choose 
the particular sentence from within a range of sentences. 30 Courts soon 
recognized that a sentence under such a scheme was virtually free from 
any form of appellate review. 31 
A. SENTENCING REFORM ACT OF 198432 
For several years, Congress was concerned with the "intolerable 
disparities that plagued the indeterminate federal sentencing system. ,,33 
In 1958, Congress responded to the noted disparities by establishing a 
sentencing institute and advisory council to make advisory criteria for 
sentencing.34 The purpose of these voluntary measures was to encourage 
"[f1ederal judges [to] reach a desirable degree of consensus as to the 
types of sentences which should be implemented in different kinds of 
cases.,,35 However, this seemed to have little effect. 36 
Several studies demonstrated the ineffectiveness of the advisory 
criteria.37 One such study reported that "the range of average sentences 
30 See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1978) (noting that early in 
America's history each crime had a fixed sentence, which changed to providing a range of sentences 
for each crime). 
31 See, e.g., Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 440-41 (1974) (stating that the firmly 
established rule was that appellate courts lacked control over any sentence that was within the 
statutory range). 
32 The full legislative history of the Sentencing Reform Act is beyond the scope of this Note. 
For a thorough, though overly critical, examination of the legislative history of the act, see Kate Stith 
& Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 223 (1993). 
33 Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein as Amici Curiae, United States v. 
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2003) (Nos 04-104, 04-105), 2004 WL 1950640 at *6. As mentioned supra, 
Sen. Hatch was one of the key drafters of the law that created the Sentencing Guidelines. See Hatch, 
supra note I. Sen. Kennedy was the other primary drafter of the law. See id. Under the 
indeterminate sentencing system, each crime had a range of sentences from which the sentencing 
judge could choose. For example, a crime might have had a sentence of six to sixteen years in 
prison. See id. The judge was given no guidance beyond that range and was free to choose from 
anywhere in that range. See id. The problem was an extreme lack of consistency. See id. One 
defendant could receive the six years in prison from a "lenient" judge, while someone who 
committed the same crime in the same manner, and who had the same criminal history, could receive 
sixteen years from a "tough" judge. See id. 
34 28 U.S.C.A § 334(a) (West 2007). 
35 S. REp. No. 85-2013, at 3 (1958) 
36 See Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *9 (citing Marvin 
Frankel, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 5, 66 (1972). Federal Judge Frankel-
considered a leading authority on federal sentencing-said that "the sentencing institute is almost 
irrelevant" and that the disparities under the indeterminate sentencing scheme were "terrifying and 
intolerable for a society that professes devotion to the rule oflaw." See id at 5, 66. 
37 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 44 n.l45 (1983) (listing some of the studies that were presented to 
Congress). 
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for forgery [ran] from thirty months in the Third Circuit to eighty-two 
months in the District of Columbia. ,,38 The trend was noted in several 
other studies that Congress identified as part of a set of hearings. 39 Even 
worse, the trend indicated that several judges were considering factors 
that were inappropriate or even illegal to consider, such as race and 
gender.40 In response, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 ("SRA,,).41 The SRA was the product of nearly a decade of work in 
the House and Senate to overhaul the federal sentencing scheme. 42 
The cornerstone of the SRA was the creation of a sentencing 
guidelines system.43 The act created the independent Sentencing 
Commission.44 The primary role of the Sentencing Commission was to 
establish a set of guidelines to be used during sentencing by district 
judges.45 The Sentencing Guidelines were supposed to further the 
objectives of the SRA.46 The objectives of sentencing as announced in 
the SRA were 
(1) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect 
for the law, and to provide just punishment; (2) to afford 
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; (3) to protect the 
public from further crimes of the defendant; and (4) to provide 
the defendant with educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment.47 
One area of debate was whether the Guidelines would be mandatory 
or advisory.48 Under the House of Representatives' version of the bill, 
38 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 41 n.l43 (1983) (quoting Whitney N. Seymour, 1972 Sentencing 
Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.S. B.J. 163, 167 (1973». 
39 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 44 (1983). 
40 See Brief for Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *11 (citing 
REFORM OF THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL 
LAWS AND PROCEDURES OF THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., 
PT. 13,9047 (1977) (Testimony of Prof. Alan Dershowitz); H.R. REp. No. 98-1017 at 102 (1983)). 
41 See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, PuB. L. No. 98-473, 98 STAT. 1987 (codified as 
amended at 18 U.S.c. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586, & 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 
(1988». The SRA was part of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984. See also Brief for 
Senators Hatch, Kennedy and Feinstein, supra note 33, at *12. 
42 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 37 (1983). 
43 S. REp. No. 98-225 at 51-52 (1983). 
44 28 U.S.C.A. § 991(a) (West 2007). 
45 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 54 (1983). 
46 See Hatch, supra note 1, at 188-189. 
47 See id., at 188. 
48 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 294 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part) (citing H.R. 6012, 98th CONG., 2D SESS. (1983». 
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the Guidelines were merely advisory.49 However, under the Senate's 
version, the Guidelines were mandatory.5o Several senators expressed 
their desire to keep the Guidelines mandatory.51 As a result of a 
compromise between the House and the Senate, the Guidelines were 
made mandatory on district courts, and courts of appeals were granted 
explicit authority to review sentences and remand for resentencing if 
necessary. 52 
B. THE JONES, ApPRENDI, RING, AND BLAKELY CASES CAST DOUBT ON 
THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
Beginning in 1999, the Supreme Court began issuing decisions that 
cast doubt on judicial factfinding. 53 While only one of the cases actually 
involved the federal criminal system,54 these cases led to the question 
whether the Sentencing Guidelines were constitutional. 55 
1. Jones v. United States 
In Jones v. United States,56 the Court interpreted the federal 
carjacking statute. 57 According to the statute, if a carjacking resulted in 
serious bodily harm or in death, the sentence was increased. 58 This 
additional fact was determined by the judge and was viewed as a 
"sentencing factor" by the lower courtS.59 In a five-to-four decision, the 
49 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
H.R. 6012, 98th CONG., 2D SESS. (1983». 
50 S. REP. No. 98-225 at 79 (1983) (stating that the Senate Judiciary Committee specifically 
rejected a proposed amendment that would make the Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory, 
citing the "poor record of states ... which have experimented with 'voluntary' guidelines."). 
51 The vote in the House was splintered on whether to keep the Guidelines mandatory, but 
the Senate was nearly unanimous, voting eighty-five to three in favor of making the Guidelines 
binding. See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, 1., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 
130 CONGo REC. 1649 (1984». 
52 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 294 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting part) (citing 130 
CONGo REc. 29730 (1984». 
53 See, e.g., Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi V. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466 (2000); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
54 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 
55 See, e.g., Blakely, 542 U.S. at 325 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
56 See Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 
57 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119 (West 2007). 
58 18 U.S.c.A. § 2119(2), (3) (West 2007). 
59 See United States V. Jones, 526 U.S. 227, 231-232 (1999). The Ninth and Eleventh 
Circuits had specifically interpreted the statute in such a way and no other circuit had reached the 
opposite interpretation. See United States v. Oliver. 60 F.3d 547, 551-554 (9th Cir. 1995); United 
States v. Williams, 51 F.3d 1004, 1009-1010 (II th Cir. 1995). 
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Court determined that this is not a sentencing factor; rather, the statute 
establishes three distinct crimes.6o The ftrst crime is a carjacking with no 
serious injury,61 the second is a carjacking resulting in serious bodily 
injury,62 and the third is a carjacking resulting in death.63 
Justices Stevens and Scalia each filed a concurring opinion.64 Both 
argued that it is "unconstitutional to remove from the jury the assessment 
of facts that alter the congressionally prescribed range of penalties.,,65 
The majority avoided the issue of declaring sentencing factors per se 
unconstitutional by determining that the carjacking statute established 
three separate crimes rather than one crime with two sentencing factors. 66 
While the Court's opinion does not actually stand for the proposition that 
a trial court cannot use sentencing enhancements,67 the two concurring 
opinions laid the groundwork for the line of cases that would ultimately 
result in the Booker decision. 68 
2. Apprendi v. New Jersey 
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,69 the Court examined New Jersey's 
hate-crime statute.70 On December 22, 2004, Charles Apprendi fired 
several shots into the home of an African-American family that had just 
moved into a previously all-white neighborhood. 71 The grand jury 
returned a twenty-three-count indictment.72 In a plea deal, Apprendi 
pleaded guilty to two counts of possession of a ftrearm for an unlawful 
purpose (counts three and eighteen) and one count of possession of an 
60 Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. 
61 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(1) (West 2007). 
62 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(2) (West 2007). 
63 18 U.S.C.A. § 2119(3) (West 2007). 
64 Jones, 526 U.S. at 252 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring) 
(arguing that judicial factfinding that increases a defendant's sentence violates the Sixth Amendment 
right to trial by jury). 
65 United States v. Jones, 526 U.S. 227,253 (1999) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
66 [d. at 243 n.6. The Court stated that, consistent with its practice, if a statute is capable of 
two interpretations, one of which raises constitutional questions and the other does not, the Court 
will choose the latter interpretation. [d. 
67 [d. at 239. The Court avoided the issue of sentencing enhancements in order to avoid 
making a constitutional decision. See also id. at 243 n.6 (noting the majority's constitutional 
concern, but simultaneously avoiding the question). 
68 See id. at 253 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
69 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). 
70 See id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e) (West Supp. 1999-2000). 
71 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. 
72 [d. 
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anti-personnel bomb for an unlawful purpose (count twenty-two).73 The 
prosecution dismissed the remaining twenty counts.74 Counts three and 
eighteen each carried a possible sentence of five to ten years' 
imprisonment and count twenty-two carried a maximum sentence of 
three to five years' imprisonment.75 The prosecution reserved the right 
to seek an enhancement based on New Jersey's hate-crime law as to 
count eighteen,76 and Apprendi reserved the right to challenge the 
constitutionality of the hate-crime enhancement. 77 The trial court then 
found, based on Apprendi's comments to the police, that he had acted to 
intimidate a group based upon their race.78 This additional finding 
established Apprendi's eligibility for a hate-crime enhancement.79 This 
determination was made by the judge under a preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard. 80 
A five-justice majoritl1 of the Supreme Court held that the 
Constitution requires any fact, other than prior conviction, that expands 
the sentence beyond the statutory maximum, be decided by the jury using 
a beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard.82 The same five justices in the 
Apprendi majority would later decide Blakely and Booker. 83 Apprendi 
signaled where the Court was headed with regard to sentencing factors 
and would be a basis for the following decisions.84 
3. Ring v. Arizona 
The Court continued the trend of disfavoring so-called sentencing 
73 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:39-4(a) (West 1995) (possession of a gun for an unlawful purpose); 
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:43-6(a)(3) (West 1995) (possession of an anti-personnel bomb); Apprendi, 
530 U.S. at 469-470. 
74 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,469 (2000). 
75 [d. 
76 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470. 
77 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 470. 
78 [d. 
79 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:44-3(e). 
80 Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 469 (2000). 
81 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468. The five justices were Justices Stevens, Scalia, Thomas, 
Souter and Ginsburg. 
82 Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490. 
83 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 297 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 
220,225 (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part). 
84 See generally Berman Douglas, Appraising and Appreciating Apprendi, 12 FED. 
SENTENCING REp. 303 (1999-2000). See also Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 523 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the case would have far-reaching implications and would flood the lower courts with 
further litigation). 
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factors that expanded the sentence in Ring v. Arizona.85 Arizona's 
sentencing scheme provided that if the jury convicted the defendant of 
fIrst-degree murder, then the judge had the responsibility of finding the 
existence or non-existence of certain aggravating factors.86 
Timothy Ring was involved in a robbery with two other men. 87 One 
person died and Ring was charged with premeditated murder and felony 
murder. 88 The jury found Ring guilty of felony murder rather than 
premeditated first-degree murder. 89 The trial judge then found that Ring 
was a major participant in the robbery and that he was the actual killer. 90 
Based on these fIndings, the trial judge sentenced Ring to death. 91 
The Supreme Court of Arizona took Ring's case on automatic direct 
appeal. 92 While acknowledging that Jones and Apprendi cast some doubt 
on the state's capital system, the state court nonetheless held that the 
sentencing scheme was constitutiona1.93 Ring ftled a petition for 
certiorari, which was granted.94 The United States Supreme Court held 
that it was unconstitutional for the judge, rather than the jury, to fInd the 
aggravating factors.95 The Court pointed out that without the finding of 
an aggravating factor, Ring would not have been eligible for the death 
penalty.96 As a result, the maximum penalty for which Ring was eligible 
based on the jury verdict alone was life without the possibility of 
parole. 97 Arizona law specifIcally provided that the judge alone should 
determine the existence of aggravating factors and that the judge could 
only sentence the defendant to death if the judge found at least one 
aggravating factor and no mitigating factor suffIcient to justify 
85 See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 588 (2002). 
86 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001) (The statute in question was 
amended in 2002 to remove the reference to the judge holding the hearing. See ARIz. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 13-703(C) (West 2007). 
87 Ring, 536 U.S. at 590-59\. 
88 ld. 
89 ld. The jury deadlocked on the premeditated murder charge, with six jurors voting to 
acquit. ld. 
90 ld. at 594. 
91 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584,594 (2002). 
92 See State v. Ring, 25 P.3d 1139, 1142 (Ariz. 2001). 
93 ld. at 1150-52. 
94 See Ring v. Arizona, 534 U.S. 1103 (2002) (order granting certiorari). 
95 Ring, 536 U.S. at 609. Justice Breyer wrote an opinion concurring in the judgment. [d. at 
613. In it he argued that sentencing enhancements are constitutional but that only a jury can 
sentence a defendant to death. [d. at 614. No other justice joined in his opinion, and Justice Scalia 
filed a concurring opinion in which he specifically rejected Justice Breyer's position. ld. at 612. 
96 Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 597 (2002). 
97 [d. at 592. 
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leniency.98 
The Court earlier had ruled that Arizona's sentencing scheme was 
constitutional. 99 However, the Court stated that the earlier decision was 
incompatible with Apprendi and could not stand. loo In a concurring 
opinion, Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, made the Court's 
position clear.101 He stated that the "guarantee of the Sixth Amendment 
is that all facts essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the 
defendant receives-whether the statute calls them elements of the 
offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane-must be found by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt." 102 
4. Blakely v. Washington 
The Court made clear in Blakely v. Washington that determinate 
sentencing schemes had the same constitutional defects as those found in 
Apprendi and Ring. 103 In 1998, Ralph Blakely kidnapped his estranged 
wife and son. 104 The State of Washington initially charged him with 
kidnapping in the first degree. 105 Blakely eventually pled guilty to 
second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and the use of a 
fIrearm. 106 Under the facts admitted in his plea alone, the maximum 
sentence available was fifty-three months. I07 Despite this, the trial court 
sentenced him to ninety months because the court found that he acted 
with "deliberate cruelty.,,108 
Following the trend that began in Apprendi and continued in Ring, 
the Court, in another five-to-four decision, held that the statutory 
maximum for a sentence is the highest sentence that a defendant could 
receive based upon the jury verdict or facts admitted at a sentencing 
hearing alone. I09 The State of Washington argued that there was no 
98 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-703(C) (West Supp. 2001) 
99 See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). 
100 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 589. 
101 See Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
102 Ring v. Arizona; 536 U.S. 584, 610 (2002) 
103 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004). 
I~ [d. at 298. 
105 WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9A.40.020(1) (2000). 
106 See Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. See also WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9AAO.030(1) (2000) 
(second degree kidnapping); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 1O.99.020(3)(p) (2000) (defining crimes 
involving domestic violence); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.125 (2000) (use of a firearm in the 
commission of a crime). 
107 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 299. 
lOS /d. at 299-300. 
109 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313 (2004). 
10
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Apprendi violation because the statutory maximum was not the fifty-
three months but rather the ten-year maximum for class B felonies. 11O In 
rejecting this argument, the Court stated specifically that the statutory 
maximum was the highest sentence "the judge may impose solely on the 
basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or admitted by the 
defendant. "III 
The dissenters, led by Justice O'Connor, complained that this 
sentencing scheme was indistinguishable from the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines (which had not been ruled unconstitutional) and that there 
was a distinct difference between sentencing factors and elements of the 
crime. 112 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, responded to the 
criticism by stating that there was no decision being made with regard to 
the Sentencing Guidelines. ll3 He went further to argue that under the 
system advocated by the dissenters, it would be perfectly constitutional 
to convict someone of illegal possession of a firearm but receive a 
sentence for killing someone. 114 Justice O'Connor argued that Justice 
Scalia was taking his argument to the extreme and that there was a built-
in political check to prevent this.115 However, she did not elaborate on 
what that political check might be. 116 
C. BOOKER MAKES IT OFFICIAL 
Following Blakely, several courts were unsure whether the 
Guidelines were actually implicated. ll7 Some courts were following the 
Guidelines, but only insofar as the facts of a guilty plea or a jury finding 
dictated. I 18 At least one court declared the Guidelines in their entirety 
110 [d. at 303. 
III [d. (emphasis in original). 
112 [d. at 325 (O'Connor J., dissenting). See also Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Respondent, Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (No. 02-1632) 2004 WL 
177025 at *1 (arguing that "[aJlthough the Washington sentencing guidelines system differs in 
significant respects from the United States Sentencing Guidelines, a decision invalidating judicial 
departure authority here could call into question the constitutionality of the federal Guidelines"). 
113 Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305 n.9. 
114 [d. at 306. 
115 Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 307 n.IO (2004) (commenting on Justice 
O'Connor's dissent). 
116 [d. (commenting on Justice O'Connor's dissent). 
117 See, e.g., Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28, 
2004). 
118 See Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28, 2004); 
United States v. Booker, 375 F.3d 508, 510 (7th Cir. 2004). In Fanfan, the judge relied not only on 
the majority opinion in Blakely but also on the opinions of the dissenters and the Solicitor General's 
amicus brief. Fanfan, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5. 
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unconstitutional. 119 These courts were not making any judicial findings 
of fact whatsoever. 120 Given the upheaval in the state of the law and the 
need to have the issue clarified, the Senate unanimously passed a 
resolution asking the Supreme Court to declare whether the Guidelines 
were constitutional. 121 The Court agreed to hold a special session to 
determine the constitutionality of the Guidelines. 122 The Court granted 
certiorari in two cases, United States v. Booker and United States v. 
Fanfan.123 
The Court granted certiorari on two questions: (1) whether the 
Sentencing Guidelines violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights as 
interpreted by Blakely, and (2) if the first question was answered in the 
affirmative, what was the remedy.124 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Stevens, and joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, Souter and Ginsburg, the 
Court held that the Guidelines, as applied in these cases, violated the 
defendants' Sixth Amendment rights. 125 Despite the fact that the Blakely 
Court had stated that the Guidelines were not at risk of being declared 
unconstitutional,126 the Court found that they were indistinguishable from 
the sentencing scheme that the State of Washington employed. 127 In a 
separate opinion for the Court, authored by Justice Breyer, and joined by 
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy and Ginsburg, 
the Court held that congressional intent dictated that the Guidelines be 
made advisory. 128 Thus, the Guidelines were not entirely eliminated. 129 
119 United States v. Ameline, 376 F.3d 967,970 (9th Cir. 2004) [Ameline 1]. 
120 See, e.g., Fanfan v. United States, No. 03-47, 2004 WL 1723114, at *5 (D. Me. June 28, 
2004). Instead of making judicial findings of fact, these courts were basing the sentence solely on 
what was found by the jury or what was admitted in the guilty plea. See id. 
121 S. Con. Res. 130, 108th Congo (2004); 150 CONGo REC. S8572 - S8574. The Senate 
Judiciary Committee also held a series of hearings in which testimony was presented regarding the 
state of the law. The transcripts of these hearings can be accessed at 
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearing.cfm?id=1260 (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). 
122 See United States v. Booker, 542 U.S. 956 (2004); United States v. Fanfan, 542 U.S. 956 
(2004) (order granting certiorari and setting an expedited briefing schedule). 
123 See United States V. Booker, 375 F.3d 508 (7th Cir. 2004), cert. granted, 542 U.S. 956 
(2004); Fanfan v. United States, 2004 WL 1723114 (D. Me. 2004), cen. granted before judgment, 
542 U.S. 956 (2004). 
124 United States V. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 229 n.l (2005) (Stevens, J., for the Court in part). 
125 [d. at 225-227 (Stevens, J. for the Court in part). The Court announced a joint decision for 
United States v. Booker and United States V. Fanfan as a single opinion under the heading United 
States v. Booker. [d. at 220. All references to Booker necessarily also encompass the Fanfan 
decision. 
126 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296,305 n.9 (2004). 
127 Booker, 543 U.S. at 230 (Stevens, J., for the Court in part). Ironically, the Court partially 
relied on Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Blakely. [d. 
128 [d. at 244-246 (Breyer, J., for the Court in part). Justice Breyer's opinion is referred to as 
the "remedial" opinion because it deals with the remedy to be applied after the Court declared the 
12
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In total, five opinions were issued, accumulating over 100 pages. 130 
The remedial opinion specifically stated that the decision would 
apply to all cases on direct review at the time of the decision. 131 The 
Court further stated that not all cases would require a remand and a new 
sentencing hearing.132 What the court declined to do, however, was 
instruct the lower courts regarding exactly which sentences would 
require a new hearing and which would not. 133 The Court simply 
referred to "ordinary prudential concerns."I34 
II. THE "PLAIN-ERROR PROBLEM" 
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b) provides defendants an 
opportunity to challenge errors that were not preserved at trial.135 Also 
known as the plain-error standard of review, Rule 52(b) gives courts the 
opportunity to correct particularly egregious errors that were not objected 
to at trial. 136 In order to show plain error that is reversible, an appellant 
must show the following: (1) that there was error; (2) that the error was 
plain; (3) that the error affected substantial rights; and (4) that the error 
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings. 137 
The typical plain-error case places the burden of showing prejudice 
on the appellant. 138 In United States v. Olano, the Court held that while 
this is usually the case, there were two types of errors that were 
exceptions to this rule. 139 The two categories of exceptions the Court 
listed were "a special category of forfeited errors" and a class of "errors 
that should be presumed prejudicial."l40 However, the Court specifically 
mandatory Guidelines unconstitutional. Id. 
129 Id. Justice Breyer was actually involved in drafting the SRA. He was counsel to the 
Senate Judiciary Committee and was one of the first commissioners on the Sentencing Commission. 
See Michael O'Hear, The Original Intent of Uniformity in Federal Sentencing, 74 U. CIN. L. REv. 
749,778 (2006) 
130 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,220-334 (2005). 
131 See id. at 268 (Breyer, J .• for the Court in part). 
132 Id. 
133 See Jenkins. supra note 6. at 821. 
134 Booker. 543 U.S. at 268 (Breyer. J .• for the Court in part). 
135 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
136 Id. If a defendant does not object to an error at trial. then that objection is normally 
considered forfeited. See United States v. Olano. 507 U.S. 725. 734 (1993). The plain-error rule 
allows a defendant to avoid this harsh result in certain cases. Id. 
137 See Johnson v. United States. 520 U.S. 461. 467 (1997). 
138 See Olano. 507 U.S. at 734. 
139 Id. at 735. 
140 Id. 
13
Guasco: Limited Remand in Sentencing Hearings
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2007
622 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW '[Vol. 37 
declined to elaborate on what it meant by either of these categories. 141 
The clear implication is that there will be some cases in which the 
traditional burden does not apply to the defendant but rather to the 
government. 142 The first type of Olano exception has been referred to as 
a "structural error" and is defined as a "defect affecting the framework 
within which the trial proceeds, rather than simply an error in the trial 
process itself.,,143 There is a strong presumption that no structural error 
has occurred when there has been an impartial adjudicator and a 
competent lawyer to represent the defendant. 144 Because of this, claims 
of structural error rarely succeed. 145 While a claim that Booker error is 
structural is unlikely to succeed, the fact that there are exceptions 
provided a starting point for some circuits. 146 
Most of the circuits have found that Booker error comes not from 
judicial factfinding, but rather when the extra-verdict findings are made 
in a mandatory guideline system. 147 Consequently, anyone sentenced 
under the belief that the Sentencing Guidelines were mandatory has 
satisfied the first prong of the test to establish reversible plain error. 148 
The second prong is similarly easy to satisfy, because an error is plain if 
it is "contrary to the law at the time of appeal .... ,,149 Any case that was 
on direct appeal at the time that Booker was announced would satisfy this 
prong. 150 
The problem arises with the third prong. 15l If the defendant's 
sentence would have been the same under the advisory scheme, then no 
141 Id. 
142 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 735 (1993). 
143 See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 309-10 (1986). 
144 See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,8 (1999). 
145 No circuit has referred to Booker error as structural. However, Judge Tjoflat of the 
Eleventh Circuit argued in dissent that Booker error is structural. See United States v. Rodriguez, 
406 F.3d 1261, 1282 (11th Cir. 2005) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting from the denial of rehearing en banc). 
146 See Deborah Nail, United States v. Booker: The Presumption of Prejudice in Plain Error 
Review, 81 CHI-KENT LAW REVIEW 621, 635 (2006). 
147 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 75 (1st Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Williams, 399 F.3d 450, 458 (2d Cir. 2005); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511, 518 (5th Cir. 
2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471,482-83 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Pirani, 406 
F.3d 543, 550 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 906 (lOth Cir. 
2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 1300 (lIth Cir. 2005); United States v. Smith, 
401 F.3d 497,499 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
148 See Rodriguez, 406 F.3d at 1262 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
149 See Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461,468 (1997). 
150 See Rodriguez, 406 F.3d at 1262 (Carnes, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing en 
bane). 
151 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1078 (9th Cir. 2005) [Ameline ill]. 
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substantial rights have been affected. 152 In most circumstances it will be 
impossible to tell whether the sentence would have been the same. 153 As 
the majority in Ameline explained, "the record in very few cases will 
provide a reliable answer to the question of whether the judge would 
have imposed a different sentence had the Guidelines been viewed as 
advisory.,,154 Most of the circuits assume that if the third prong is met, 
then the fourth prong is automatically met as well. 155 
III. THE CIRCUITS' VARIOUS RESPONSES 
In light of Booker, there has emerged a four-way circuit split 
regarding how to approach the "Plain-Error Problem.,,156 The approach 
used by a particular defendant's circuit is one of the key factors in 
determining whether the defendant will receive a new sentencing 
hearing. 157 This has created a disparity similar to the disparities that 
Congress attempted to avoid in creating the Sentencing Guidelines. 158 It 
is a disparity that the Supreme Court has so far declined to address. 159 
A. THE "HARD-LINE" APPROACH 
Several circuits have held that traditional plain-error review should 
apply.l60 The position of these courts is that if the appellate panel cannot 
determine whether the error was prejudicial, then the defendant has not 
met his or her burden and is not entitled to any form of relief. 161 Under 
152 See id. 
153 See id. 
154 Id. at 1079. 
155 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 406 F.3d 1261, 1265-66 (10th Cir. 2005) (Carnes, J., 
concurring in the denial of rehearing en bane). The one exception to this is the Tenth Circuit, which 
is discussed infra. See infra notes 168-174 and accompanying text. 
156 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. 
159 See, e.g., United States v. Rodriguez, 545 U.S. 1127 (2005) (denying certiorari in one of 
the cases that has raised the issue and in which the Solicitor General recommended that review be 
granted). 
160 The Circuits that have decided the traditional rule should be applied are the First, Fifth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en bane) 
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 266 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 05-5547); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 
511,522 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied 126 S. Ct. 43 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2005) (No. 04-9517); United States 
v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291, 
1300 (11th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1127. 
161 See Pirani, 406 F.3d at 543; Mares, 402 F.3d at 522; Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d at 78-79; 
Rodriguez, 398 F.3d at 130. Circuit Judges Wardlaw, Gould, O'Scannlain, and Bea argued in 
dissent that the Ninth Circuit should adopt the traditional form of plain error as well. Ameline III, 
15
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this approach, the inquiry shifts from whether the sentence would have 
been substantially different to whether the defendant can prove that it 
would have been substantially different. 162 
B. THE PRESUMPTION-OF-PREJUDICE APPROACH 
Other circuits have taken the opposite approach. 163 These circuits 
have held that whenever a defendant's sentence was enhanced based on 
facts neither admitted nor found by the jury, the defendant has shown 
prejudice. l64 Under this approach, the appellate panel compares the 
sentence that the defendant could have received based solely on the 
jury's verdict or facts admitted by the defendant, with the sentence that 
he actually received. 165 If the former would have been more favorable to 
the defendant, then the defendant has shown prejudice. l66 These circuits 
implicitly reject the finding, made by the Ninth Circuit and others, that 
judicial factfinding is "erroneous only when coupled with a mandatory 
guidelines system.,,167 
C. THE SO-CALLED "COMPROMISE" APPROACH 
The Tenth Circuit has taken an approach that one writer 
characterized as a compromise. 168 Under the Tenth Circuit's approach, 
the emphasis is placed on the fourth prong of the plain-error standard of 
review. 169 
In the en banc decision that adopted the "compromise" position," 
the majority did not even seek to answer the third prong. 170 Instead, the 
court took judicial notice of the fact that the defendant had his sentence 
409 F.3d at 1087. 
162 See Nail, supra note 146, at 635. 
163 The Circuits that have explicitly adopted the presumption-of-prejudice approach are the 
Fourth and Sixth Circuits. See United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Oliver, 397 F.3d 369 (6th Cir. 2005). The Third Circuit, while consistently remanding for new 
sentencing, has actually refused to articulate a standard. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 
162 (3d Cir. 2005). Even though the Third Circuit refuses to articulate a standard, its practices show 
that the court is presuming prejudice. See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 830. 
164 See Davis, 407 F.3d at 162; Hughes, 401 F.3d at 548; Oliver, 397 F.3d at 369. 
165 See, e.g., Hughes, 401 F.3d at 548. 
166 [d. 
167 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir 2005) (en banc) [Ameline IIIJ. 
168 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815 (characterizing the Tenth Circuit's approach in United 
States v. Gonzales-Huerta as a "compromise"); see also United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 
727,736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en bane). 
169 See United States v. Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 736 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc). 
170 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815; see also Gonzales-Huena, 403 F.3d at 736. 
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enhanced based only on a prior conviction. 171 In addition, his sentence 
was on the low end of the scale of what he could have received. 172 The 
court assumed that the third prong of the plain-error test was met and 
proceeded to analyze the fourth prong.173 Under the compromise 
approach, the burden of showing that the error affected the integrity of 
the proceedings is on the defendant. 174 
D. THE "LIMITED-REMAND" APPROACH 
In United States v. Ameline, the Ninth Circuit considered what the 
appropriate procedure would be for individuals sentenced under the 
mandatory system but who failed to challenge the sentence at the time of 
sentencing.175 The court acknowledged that different circuits have taken 
different paths and stated that it benefited from discussions by the other 
circuits. 176 The court chose to join the Second, Seventh, and D.C. 
Circuits in creating a "limited-remand" procedure. 177 
The Ninth Circuit's limited-remand procedure established a new 
version of the plain-error standard of review. 178 The new procedure 
requires the appellate panel to remand the case to the district court for the 
sole purpose of asking the lower court whether the sentence would have 
been different under the new post-Booker advisory guidelines. 179 The 
court relied on 18 U.S.c. § 3742(f), which grants the court of appeals the 
authority to remand a case solely for the purpose of resentencing. 180 The 
court reasoned that "the power to remand for resentencing necessarily 
encompasses the lesser power to order a limited remand." 181 
In section IV of the Ameline opinion, the majority clearly articulated 
the exact process. 182 First, when faced with unpreserved Booker error, 
the court must determine whether the defendant wants to pursue the 
error. 183 If the defendant does choose to pursue the error, then the panel 
171 Gonzales-Huerta, 403 F.3d at 738-39. 
172 [d. 
173 [d. at 736. 
174 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 826. 
175 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1074 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IIIJ. 
176 [d. 
177 [d. at 1079. 
178 See id. 
179 [d. 
180 [d. 
181 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IIIJ 
(summarizing United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103, 117 (2d CiT. 2005». 
182 Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1084. 
183 [d. This will be accomplished by asking defendant's counsel to brief whether the 
17
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must search the record to determine if it is clear whether the sentence 
would have been different under the new advisory scheme. l84 In most 
cases, it will be unclear from the record. 185 If the panel reaches such a 
dead end, it will order a limited remand. 186 
For the limited remand, the question posed to the district court is 
simply whether the sentence imposed would have been materially 
different. 187 If it would not have been materially different, then the 
district court should so indicate on the record. ISS If the sentence would 
have been different, then the error was prejudicial. 189 Failing to correct a 
prejudicial error affects the integrity, fairness and public reputation of the 
court. 190 Thus, to correct this error, the district court must vacate the 
original sentence and resentence the defendant. 191 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S IMPERFECT APPROACH IS THE BEST OPTION 
The typical plain-error case places the burden of showing prejudice 
on the defendant. 192 This is the approach taken by the "hard-line" 
circuits. 193 The fatal flaw in this approach is that in essentially every 
case, it will be impossible to make such a showing. 194 As the majority in 
Ameline pointed out, the trial judge had no reason to make a record from 
defendant wants to pursue the error. [d. 
184 [d. 
185 [d. 
186 !d. In those rare instances in which the panel finds that the record is clear enough to make 
a determination that the sentencing judge would have sentenced the defendant to a more lenient 
sentence, the panel will order a full remand with a new sentencing hearing, rather than the limited 
remand. See United States v. Perez, 475 F.3d 1110, 1111 (9th Cir. 2007). 
187 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) [Ameline ill]. 
188 1d. at 1085. 
189 [d. 
190 [d. 
191 [d. The Seventh and D.C. Circuits' approach is slightly different. See United States v. 
Coles, 403 F.3d 764, 770 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005). 
Rather than have the district court immediately resentence the defendant, the district court must 
answer the question in the affirmative and send the case back to the court of appeals. See Paladino, 
401 F.3d at 484 Coles, 403 F.3d at 770. Once the appellate court receives the case, the panel must 
vacate the sentence and remand to the district court for resentencing. See Coles, 403 F.3d at 770; 
Paladino, 40 I F.3d at 484. This procedure is similar in substance but is unnecessarily convoluted. 
See Coles, 403 F.3d at 770; Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484. 
192 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
193 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78 (1st Cir. 2005) 
194 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1081 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline ill] 
(quoting Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit in Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484, who stated that placing 
the burden of showing prejudice on the defendant presents the defendant with an "impossible 
burden") (emphasis in original». 
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which the defendant can show prejudice. 19s Occasionally, a judge might 
have used the record to express disapproval of mandatory guidelines. 196 
However, this was extremely rare because judges realized that this was a 
fruitless action. 197 The sentence was mandatory under the Guidelines 
whether or not the judge approved. 198 This gave the court little incentive 
to express its disapproval with the mandatory Guidelines. l99 Forcing the 
defendant to make a showing of prejudice is, in many cases, forcing the 
defendant to make an impossible showing.2OO Judge Posner of the 
Seventh Circuit criticized the hard-line approach by saying that "we 
cannot fathom why the Eleventh Circuit wants to condemn some 
unknown fraction of criminal defendants to serve an illegal sentence.,,201 
On the other hand, the circuits that presume prejudice ignore plain-
error review and create a system that is inefficient and wastes judicial 
resources.202 To establish plain error, a defendant must make some 
showing of prejudice.203 While it is inappropriate to force a defendant to 
make that showing in the traditional manner, it is also inappropriate to 
shift the burden on that question to the government.204 In addition, 
sentencing hearings are lengthy.20s A judge must examine all evidence 
that is part of the presentence report and hear any additional evidence 
that a defendant may present.206 If the sentence is going to be 
substantially the same, the result is a colossal waste of judicial resources. 
Even worse, the circuits that follow the presumption of prejudice 
approach ignore the one clear piece of guidance that the Supreme Court 
195 See Ameline 1II, 409 F.3d at 1084. 
196 See id. Other judges, such as Senior District Judge Thelton Henderson, complain about 
the Sentencing Guidelines in general. Judge Henderson has specifically complained about the high 
mandatory minimums on drug crimes. Interview with Thelton Henderson, Senior District Judge, 
Northern District of California (Winter, 1997 -1998), available at 
http://www.pbs.orglwgbh/pageS/frontline/shows/dope/interviews/judge.html (last visited Mar. 27, 
2007). 
197 See id. In Judge Henderson's interview, he stated that there was nothing a district judge 
could do other than give the sentence dictated by the Guidelines. ld. 
198 18 U.S.C.A. 3553(b)(l) (West 2007). 
199 See Judge Henderson Interview, supra note 196. 
200 See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). 
2Ol ld. 
202 See, e.g., Judge Michael McConnell, The Booker Mess, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 665, 667 
(2006). 
203 FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(b). 
204 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 621 (reaching the opposite conclusion). 
205 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 667. As Judge McConnell points out, a sentencing 
hearing imposes high costs on the district courts, U.S. attorneys, public defenders, marshals, and 
prison authorities because of the requirements of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Id. 
206 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(i). 
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did provide. 207 The Court stated that not "every appeal will lead to a new 
sentencing hearing. ,,208 
The so-called "compromise" approach adopted by the Tenth Circuit 
is no compromise at all.209 The court refused to address the standard 
regarding the showing required to establish prejudice.210 Instead, the 
Tenth Circuit jumped straight to the fourth prong.211 While it is 
important to look at the fourth prong, placing the burden on the 
defendant imposes just as difficult a task as showing prejudice.212 The 
only way truly to show that the integrity of the court has been questioned 
is to show that the defendant received an illegal sentence. 213 If this 
showing is made, then the defendant has met the third prong.214 In 
essence, the so-called "compromise" is nothing more than taking the 
hard-line approach. 215 For example, Judge Michael McConnell 
examined the difficulty for a defendant to make a showing that would 
satisfy the Tenth Circuit's approach.216 According to Judge McConnell, 
as of 2006, only seven percent of defendants who challenged a 
mandatory application of the Guidelines using plain-error review had 
their sentences vacated and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. 217 
Of these cases, every defendant received a new sentence and over half 
had their sentences reduced by more than forty percent. 218 Yet the 
question remains how many more sentences would have been different 
had they not failed to meet the Tenth Circuit's difficult standard. 
The limited-remand approach resolves the problems presented by 
207 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220,268 (2005) (Breyer, J., for the Court in part). 
208 ld. 
209 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 841. Even Jenkins, who argued that the Tenth Circuit's 
approach is a compromise, argued that it was inappropriate to place the burden of showing prejudice 
on the defendant. Id. 
210 The court was split on this issue of what showing was required to establish prejudice even 
more than the issue of what was required under the fourth prong. See generally United States v. 
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 742 (10th Cir.2005) (Ebel, J., concurring). One judge who felt that 
the defendant failed the fourth prong actually sided with the dissenters regarding whether Gonzalez-
Huerta had established prejudice. See id. (Ebel, J., concurring). 
211 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 826. 
212 See id. at 842. The only way to show that an action casts doubt on the integrity of the 
proceedings will be to show that the sentence would ha ve been different. Id. In practice, the 
"compromise" approach will play out exactly like the hard-line approach. [d. 
213 If the defendant did not receive an illegal sentence, then the sentence is legal. If the 
sentence is legal, then clearly the integrity of the court is not called into question. 
214 See, e.g., United States v. Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68, 78-79 (I st Cir. 2005). 
215 See Jenkins, supra note 6, at 815 (defending the notion of focusing on the fourth prong but 
criticizing the Tenth Circuit for placing the burden on the defendant). 
216 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 669. 
217 /d. 
218 1d. at 672. 
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the other three options.219 This approach allows the defendant a chance 
at making a showing of prejudice without inappropriately shifting the 
burden to the government.220 Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit 
described the limited-remand approach as follows: 
It is the middle way between placing on the defendant the impossible 
burden of proving that the sentencing judge would have imposed a 
different sentence had the judge not thought the guidelines were 
mandatory and requiring that all defendants whose cases were pending 
when Booker was decided are entitled to be resentenced, even when it 
is clear that the judge would impose the same sentence and the court 
of appeals would affirm.221 
This approach is certainly not perfect.222 As the dissent in Ameline 
pointed out, this approach ignores the traditional plain-error standard of 
review. 223 By allowing a limited remand, the court lessens the burden on 
the defendant.224 In addition, this approach is clearly not as efficient as 
the hard-line approach.225 More judicial resources will be required under 
this approach.226 However, courts should be concerned with justice first 
and judicial economy second. 227 
Another problem with the limited-remand approach is the fact that 
some of the sentencing judges will be unavailable. 228 Unfortunately, this 
is unavoidable. However, these cases will be.fairly rare,229 and courts 
should not use a rare occurrence to maintain an impossible standard of 
review for everyone. 230 
The Seventh Circuit pointed out that giving a defendant an illegal 
sentence was just as much a miscarriage of justice as convicting an 
219 See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484-85 (7th Cir. 2005). 
220 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline 
IlIJ. 
221 Paladino, 401 F.3d at 484-85. 
222 Even the majority in Ameline acknowledged that the limited remand is not a perfect 
option. See Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1080. 
223 Id. at \087 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
224 Id. 
225 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1087 (9th Cir. 2005) (en bane) [Ameline IlIJ 
(Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
226 [d. 
IIIJ. 
227 See United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 484 (7th Cir. 2005). 
228 See Ameline lll, 409 F.3d at \087 (Wardlaw, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
229 See Ameline III,409 F.3d at 1082. 
230 See United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d \073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) [Ameline 
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innocent person. 231 The purpose of plain-error review is to avoid 
miscarriages of justice because they cast doubt on the integrity of the 
court. 232 Appellate courts should seek to avoid these injustices whenever 
possible. 233 In the case of post-Booker error, the limited-remand 
approach is neither the most efficient nor the easiest on the defendant. 234 
However, with these two competing considerations in mind, it is 
definitely the best approach. 235 
However, proper use of judicial resources is an issue of serious 
concern. 236 Federal courts are overburdened. 237 Several of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure have preserving judicial economy as a goal. 238 
For this reason, the court should have imposed a higher burden on the 
defendant. 239 Under the current limited-remand approach, all a defendant 
has to show is that it is unclear whether the sentencing judge would have 
imposed a different sentence. 24O It is hard to imagine a case that does not 
meet this burden.241 Further, a subsequent opinion explaining Ameline 
stated that the district court was required to consider, or at least solicit, 
the written views of counsel before answering the limited-remand 
question. 242 Unfortunately, this wastes precious resources in cases in 
which there is no question that the sentence would have been the same. 243 
231 Paladino, 401 F.3d at 483. 
232 FED. R. CRIM .P. 52(b). 
233 See, e.g., United States v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471, 483 (7th Cir. 2005). 
234 See Ameline III, 409 F.3d at 1087 (Wardlaw, 1., concuning in part and dissenting in part). 
235 It is important to note that of the four approaches, the limited-remand and the hard-line 
approaches have attracted the most circuits, with four each. See United States v. Pirani, 406 F.3d 
543 (8th Cir. 2005) (en banc); United States v. Mares, 402 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. 
Antonakopoulos, 399 F.3d 68 (1st Cir. 2005); United States v. Rodriguez, 398 F.3d 1291 (11th Cir. 
2005) (adopting hard-line approach); see also United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 
2005) (en banc) [Ameline III]; United States v. Coles, 403 F.3d 764 (D.C. Cir. 2005); United States 
v. Paladino, 401 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2005); United States v. Crosby, 397 F.3d 103 (2d Cir. 2005) 
(adopting limited remand). 
236 See Ameline 1/1, 409 F.3d at 1087 (Wardlaw, 1., concuning in part and dissenting in part). 
237 See id. 
238 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 12(g),(h)(I) (providing that certain defenses are waived if not 
consolidated with other defenses raised by motion). 
239 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 641 (arguing that there should be no burden on the 
defendant whatsoever). 
240 Ameline 1/1, 409 F.3d at 1074. 
241 United States v. Ameline, 409 F.3d 1073, 1086 (9th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (Wardlaw, J., 
concuning in part and dissenting in part) [Ameline III]. 
242 See United States v. Montgomery, 462 F.3d 1067, 1068 (9th Cir. 2006). While the Ninth 
Circuit has held that the sentencing judge must consider written materials that a defendant may want 
to offer, a recent case determined that the judge does not have to allow a defendant to allocute in 
person, especially when that defendant had the opportunity to do so at the first sentencing hearing 
but refused to do so. See United States v. Silva, 472 F.3d 683,689 (9th Cir. 2007). 
243 See, e.g., McConnell, supra note 202, at 665. 
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For this reason, the Ameline court should have imposed some burden on 
the defendant to show a reasonable probability that his or her sentence 
would have been different.244 This burden may be low, but it would help 
to weed out those cases in which there is no chance that the defendant 
will receive a new sentence.245 Yet because this burden should be highly 
fact-specific, it would be hard to articulate.246 Some examples of ways in 
which a defendant might meet this burden include the following: 
showing that there was evidence that could not be considered by the 
district court under the mandatory Guidelines, or showing that the 
defendant's sentence was on the low end of what the judge could have 
given. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The circuits that automatically remand all cases with Booker error 
ignore the clear instruction from the Supreme Court that not all cases are 
entitled to a new sentencing hearing.247 These circuits also rely on the 
presumption of prejudice, which the Supreme Court mentioned in 
Olano248 but which the Court has never actually applied. 249 On the other 
hand, the circuits that follow the hard-line approach impose a nearly 
impossible burden on defendants.25o Likewise, the Tenth Circuit's 
"compromise" is really no compromise and essentially imposes the same 
impossible burden on defendants as under the hard-line approach.25t The 
limited-remand approach resolves these two conflicting interests in the 
244 But see Nail, supra note 146, at 641 (arguing that there should be no burden on the 
defendant whatsoever). 
245 This would allow the burden to remain where it should be, on the defendant, rather than 
shifting the burden of negating prejudice to the government. 
246 The best way of wording it is to say that the defendant has shown that it is reasonably 
possible that the district court would have imposed a different sentence under an advisory Guideline 
system. 
247 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. 
248 See generally United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993). 
249 See McConnell, supra note 202, at 665. 
250 See supra notes 200-201 and accompanying text. 
251 See supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
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best way possible. 252 Moreover, by imposing a slightly higher burden on 
the defendant to show a reasonable probability that his or her sentence 
would have been different, the Ninth Circuit could have crafted an 
approach that is both sound and that reduces the load placed on district 
courts. 
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